

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE REAL.

Introductory Remarks.

1. The *Kathāvattu*, which has recently appeared in an English garb under the title of "*Points of Controversy*,"¹ is the first of the three² principal land-marks in the history of Buddhist Philosophy. It is, therefore, valuable as an historical document. But it is not without its philosophical value. Prof. Maung Tin in his able review of the work on pp. 112, 113 of the Burma Research Society, Journal, Vol. VI, Part II, attempted to briefly indicate where its real value lies. The present essay, which owes its inspiration to this third century B. C. work, is intended to develop the general philosophic interest.

2. To-day two figures stand out prominently in the philosophical arena like two ancient knights who disputed over a shield.

Henri Bergson, the French champion of the intuitive school of thought is in the forefront of modern philosophers. But the Hon. Bertrand Russell, the modern English exponent of the logico-analytic school, though comparatively the younger of the two, has already made a mark in the philosophical world especially by his criticism of Bergson.

The former is characterised by his depth of mind and the latter, by his breadth of view.

3. Bergson holds that the scope and province of philosophy is concrete, particular reality; while Russell views abstract, general truths as the object of philosophy. With this fundamental difference in their stand-points, they disagree as to means. The elder thinks that logic has no place in true philosophy; the younger regards it as an essential instrument of philosophy. With logic go language and concepts in its train.

The senior purifies instinct and extols intuition; the junior glorifies intellect and raises reason on a high pedestal. With intellect or reason go analysis, and science applied or formal or mathematical.

The former, rejecting current mechanistic and finalistic views of the universe, holds that the future is absolutely unforeseeable; the latter, believing in the universal law of causation or the uniformity of nature, considers the future to be predictable. With the former, relations expressed in a causal law are subjective; but with the latter, they are real.

Such are some of the leading differences of views between these two antagonists who appear to be irreconcilable.

4. Bergson is the target of much philosophical criticism, notably his mathematical and scientific data. But this being in the crucible of European fires does not affect the interestingness of the remarkable parallelism that exists between Bergsonism and Buddhism. It must not, however, be supposed that this parallelism precludes any idea of similar correspondence between Russell and Buddhism.

¹ Published by the Pali Text Society.

² The other two land-marks are *Milinda's Questions* and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhi-magga* or '*Pure Path* (*—intuition*).'

In Buddhism both are at once compared and contrasted. The office of this ancient system, therefore, is to offer mediation to the two combatants in a most up-to-date fight of the modern times.

5. The subject of this paper resolves itself into two questions:—

- I. What is the real?
- II. How do we know it?

The first question need not detain us long beyond indicating the import of the term "real" as understood in Buddhism and the nature of that real.

The second question concerns itself with the theory of knowledge which we purpose to set out at length under the following heads:—

- (a) Various kinds of knowledge;
- (b) Our knowledge of the real;

The second head subdivides itself into:—

- (i) How to know the real, i. e., how to attain intuition,—not Mansellian intuition which is stone-dead—by self-culture;
- (ii) How to represent it by concept and how to communicate concept by language;
- (iii) How to prove our knowledge by logic; and
- (iv) How to explain general truths, arrived at through logic and expressed in laws, by analysis.

Sub-head (i) is concerned with the process of knowledge itself and the rest deal with the product of that knowledge.

PART I.—THE REAL.

The import of the term "Real."

6. From a brief discussion¹ of such terms as "parama," "saccika," etc., it will have been seen that the term "real," as understood by Buddhists, means something actually, verifiably existing,² and irreducible as well as irreversible.³ It is not that which has existed or will exist.⁴ It is neither reducible by analysis nor reversible by intellect.

The two aspects of the Real.

7. Reality understood in this sense is either conditioned (Sāṅkhata) or unconditioned.

¹ *Pts. of Controy*, pp. 371—374.

² *Op. et loc. cit.* On the implications of the word 'exist,' see *op. cit.*, p. 85. The Bergsonian sentiment that 'to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating itself endlessly' (*Crea. Evol.*, p. 8) is no less Buddhistic as will be seen from a Buddhist dynamic conception of the real as well as from the theory of Kamma maturing itself into 'results,' Vipāka, lit. matured. Cf. also 'Reality can only be known during the moment it exists and it exists in the moment in which it is being experienced.' Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 29.

³ On irreducibility and irreversibility, see *Pts. of Controy*, *loc. cit.* Cf. "Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science. To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility we must break with scientific habits. . . . we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But this is just the function of philosophy." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 31.

⁴ "The intuition shows us what is, not what was, nor what will be" Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 29.

Unconditioned reality is Nibbāna which is absolute (Apaccaya) in the sense in which nothing else *causally relates* itself to it. It is eternal, lit., "out of time" (Kālavimutta) because, in the words of Ledi Sadaw, "It cannot be said: 'That was the Nibbāna in the time of a past Buddha; this is the Nibbāna in the time of the present Buddha; and such will be the Nibbāna in the time of a future Buddha.'"¹ Conditioned reality, on the other hand, is made up of mind and matter² and includes sense-data of infallible knowledge.³ Unlike our stable, permanent concepts, or Platonic Ideas, this latter kind of reality is characterised by the two chief phenomenal events of growth and decay, birth and death, or genesis and dissolution,⁴ since it is relative (Sapaccaya) in the sense that it *is related to* causes. Hence conditioned reality partakes of the nature of the phenomenal. Those who are accustomed to opposing the real to the phenomenal may demur to this paradoxical statement.

By phenomenon I mean an occurrence or happening. In Buddhism there is an occurrence but not a *thing* which occurs. That is, we philosophically understand things in terms of state (bhāva-sādhāna) and not in terms of agency (kattu-sādhāna).⁵ We have change but not the changing thing, we have movement but not the moving thing.⁶ An external view of this happening is appearance, but received from within the happening is a reality. This will be clear from Part II when we deal with intuition. Conditioned reality differs from unconditioned reality in that it is limited and relative.⁷ Nevertheless, when it is penetrated, we get an absolute experience of it. Hence we say that mind and matter make up the conditioned reality in its ultimate sense (paramattha-dhamma).⁸

¹ Ledi's *Paramattha-dīpanī*, p. 330. Cf. 'And past, present and future shrink into a single moment, which is eternity.' *Crea. Evol.* p. 337.

² Cf. "And matter, the reality which descends, endures only by its connection with that which *ascends*.. But life and consciousness are this very ascension.' *Crea. Evol.*, p. 390.

³ Cf. "It may be said . . . that it is the duty of the philosopher to call in question the admittedly fallible beliefs of daily life and to replace them by something more solid and irrefragable." p. 66, Russell's *Our Know. of the Ext. World*. Cf. also "Our own sense-data are primarily the facts of sense (*i. e. of our own*) sense-data and the laws of logic." *Op. cit.*, p. 72. N. B. Henceforward this work will be cited as *Lowell Lectures, 1914*.

⁴ Cf. *The Pts. of Controv.*, p. 55. See also pp. 374, 375, *op. cit.*, Cf. "If I consider my body in particular, I find that, like my consciousness, it matures little by little from infancy to old age; like myself it grows old." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 16. Cf. also "Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made." *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

⁵ See *Compd. of Phil.* pp. 2 and 7.

⁶ Cf. "There are changes, but there are not things that change; change does not need a support. There are movements, but there are not necessarily constant objects which *are moved*; movement does not imply something that is movable." Bergson's *La Perception de changement*. See Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 16.

⁷ Cf. ". . . in the one case (*i. e. of an external view*) our knowledge seems relative, relative to the position we occupy and the view we take, in the other (*i. e. case of penetration into ourselves*) it is absolute. It may be limited, but however narrow, momentary, fleeting, the vision be, we feel that it is not an external view of reality but an absolute experience of reality." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 27.

⁸ Cf. "Our own life is for each of us our contact with reality, our hold upon it. If we can bring our life *as it flows* itself to consciousness it must be reality in its ultimate meaning that we know—limited no doubt but reality in itself, not an appearance of reality." *Op. Cit.*, p. 28.

Reality and Concepts contrasted.

8. Though Buddhism is capable of reconciling the scholastic doctrines of realism, conceptualism and nominalism,¹ the real is no less distinguished from the conceptual on the one hand than from the nominal on the other.²

Ledi writes on this distinction as follows:—

“There are two kinds of facts (*Saccā's*)—nominal (*Sammuti*) and real (*Paramattha*). Such concepts as ‘being,’ ‘person,’ ‘self,’ ‘living soul,’ etc., are, indeed, not knowable, i. e. not verifiable as *existing* things-in-themselves.³ But to the majority of mankind who are incapable of understanding things as they really are, they are very important and they appear, to their mind as though they were really existent. The commonfolk, by a sort of tacit convention, assuming their actual existence, name them, and they also accept or acknowledge them. These (concepts) may be described as nominal facts, partly because of the common consent, approval or sanction of the majority and partly because they form the basis of truthful speech and of right conduct. Taking their stand upon these nominal facts, men who conduct themselves well may acquire worldly prosperity and achieve the acquisition of such and such practical knowledge.⁴ But those who act against conventional ideas of truth and right suffer.⁵

“So much for the importance of nominal facts.

“But when we come to ultimately true facts, conventionally true ones no longer hold good. Though not existing in themselves, nominal facts mislead the average folk into thinking that they are existing. And they form the basis of the twenty soul theories and three principal heresies.⁶ Thus conventionally true facts do not permit the foolish to escape from misery. Hence they are reversible⁷ and faulty to that extent. Ultimately true facts are twofold—natural and Ariyan. Such facts as ‘moral thought,’ etc., described in the books of the Abhidhamma are naturally true. Because of their actual, verifiable existence *per se*, they do not lead astray any one who believes the truths of propositions like these: ‘Such and such a moral thought *exists*’; ‘Such and such a feeling of pleasure *exists*.’

“But when we come to deal with Ariyan facts, some of these propositions cannot be said to be quite true. For example, feeling was relatively spoken of by the Buddha as pleasurable, painful and neutral; and this by a reference to the mere difference in the degree of experiencing, but not because there is such a positive feeling as absolute pleasure. The fact is that all kinds of feeling under all manner of circumstances of universal flux and causation, etc., are just pain, pure and simple, i. e., *DUKKHA* proper.⁸

¹ *Compend.* p. 223.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

³ *Sabhāvato avijjamāṇā yeva.* Cf. “I think it may be laid down quite generally that, in so far as physics or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone.” *Lowell Lectures*, 1914, p. 81.

⁴ The idea is that conventional truths are sufficient for all practical purposes. Cf. “It is, therefore, natural and legitimate in daily life to proceed by the juxtaposition and portioning out of concepts; no philosophical difficulty will arise from this procedure, since by a tacit agreement, we shall abstain from philosophising” *Berg. Intro. to Metaph.* p. 36. Also cf. “. . . a practical knowledge aimed at the profit to be drawn from them.” *Op. cit.* p. 37.

⁵ Lit. fill the purgatory.

⁶ See p. 118, Ledi, *J. P. T. S.*, 1913-14.

⁷ On the reversibility of our conventional ideas, cf. “The mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast, all its categories. . . . To philosophise therefore, is, to invert the habitual direction of thought” *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 59.

⁸ Here we are dealing with the psychology of feeling under philosophical, and not ethical, aspect. That Buddhism is not altogether pessimistic may be seen from *Pts. of Controv.*, pp. 127-129.

"Similarly, morality, so-called because it yields unfaulty, happy results, was spoken of relatively with reference to immorality. True, all the three-planed things are simply faulty inasmuch as they are bound up with 'intoxicants,' are liable to 'corruptions' and capable of developing 'floods,' 'bonds,' and 'graspings.' Moreover, they are truly fruitful of ills in that they are productive of results which constitute the Fact of Ill (Dukkha-sacca).

"Again, the couplet¹ of 'internal' (i. e. personal) was also spoken of with reference to the common sense of mankind. The fact is that all the four-planed things are truly no selves. Where can you get the distinction of internal or personal? All are equally external.² Yes, it may be remembered that the Buddha said; 'One sees conditioned things as external (parato).' Thus: all couplets and triplets in our doctrine are to be similarly understood in the relative sense.

"Ariyan facts may be understood as follows:—

- (a) The three-planed things constitute the Ariyan Fact of True Ill;
- (b) Craving constitutes the Ariyan Fact of its True Cause;
- (c) Nibbāna alone constitutes the Ariyan Fact of its True Cessation; and
- (d) Intuition, with eight factors, constitutes the Ariyan Fact of True Path to Nibbāna.

"These alone are unshakeable, universally perfect and absolutely true facts in the understanding of pure Ariyans."³

9. Concepts are mental creations or logical constructions.⁴ But the real transcends⁵ them. In his philosophy of Relations, at p. 25 of the P. T. S. Journal of 1915-16, Ledi emphasises the changeability⁶ of the real

¹ Cf. "Concepts . . . generally go together in couples and represent two contraries. There is hardly any concate reality which cannot be observed from two opposing stand-points, which cannot be consequently subsumed under two antagonistic concepts. Hence a thesis and an antithesis." *Intro. to Metaph.* p. 34.

² Cf. There is a reality that is external and yet immediately given to the mind. *Op. cit.* p. 55. In Buddhism the bare conscious subject, which is ordinarily spoken of as self, is not conscious of itself (p. 180, *Pts. of Controv.*), because in the Bergsonian phraseology, our intellect always "turns to the rear" (*Crea. Evol.* p. 49) and "looks behind." On the impossibility of self-consciousness, see Part II *infra.* Cf. ". . . ; but I think, however self may be defined, even when it is taken as the bare subject, it cannot be supposed to be a part of the immediate object of sense;" *Lowell Lectures*, 1914, p. 74.

³ Pp. 114-16, Ledi's *Paramattha-dīpanī*, fully rendered. I have quoted it at length partly because this proud rival of *Tikagyaw* has not been edited, and translated, and published in European languages, but chiefly because I have preferred that the learned Doctor should speak in his own orthodox way so that I may not be suspected of reading Bergsonism into Buddhism. Cf. also Ledi, pp. 124-130 *J. P. T. S.*, 1913-14.

In the expression "Ariyan fact" we have not used the word "fact" in the Russellian sense of a certain thing *having* a certain quality or relation (P. 51, *Lowell Lectures*, 1914) but in the Buddhist sense of something *existing*.

When Buddhists say: "This is ill," both terms in this atomic proposition of Russell, (*Op. cit.* p. 53) refer to a single fact which exists. The Pubbaseliya sect drew a distinction between this objective concrete fact and the subjective abstract fact of an object *possessing* its own characteristics. The former corresponds to reality and the latter, to truth, or Russell's atomic fact. But they confused the word "fact" between the two senses. On Atomic propositions, see Part II, *infra*.

⁴ *Pts. of Controv.*, p. 373. Cf. "All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the "thing" is a mere logical construction!" P. 89, *Low. Lec.*, 1914.

⁵ *Pts. of Controv.*, *loc. cit.* Cf. "Either metaphysic is this play of ideas, or else, if it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, concepts are necessary to it. . . . But it is only true to itself when it goes beyond the concept," *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 18. Cf. By way of reality, leaving concepts, . . . (Sammutumī ṭhapatvā). *Tikagyaw*.

⁶ Cf. ". . . the real, the experienced, and the concrete are recognised by the fact that they are variability itself" *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 41.

as the very essence of the distinction between unstable realities and stable concepts.¹

Contrasting mobile realities with stable concepts the learned Doctor writes:—

"They (i. e., the realities) come to be and cease from moment to moment. Now there is no 'entity' or 'person' (which are concepts) who in one life comes to be and passes away from moment to moment. . . . But the aggregates which are ultimate phenomena come to be and pass away from moment to moment even in a single day. They do not persist *pari passu* with the individual spell of life."²

The fluid real that makes up the person of a being changes every moment, though our rigid concept of that being lasts his whole lifetime.³

The Nature of the Real.

10. The real then changes without ceasing. This Buddhist dynamic conception of the real finds an expression in a universal proposition. All things in the making are changing (*Sabbe-saṅkhārā aniccā*).⁴ The static is conceptual; the movement or motion or mobility is real.

Buddhists compare life to the ceaseless flow of a river⁵ or to the continuous burning of a flame. They hold that for no two consecutive moments is the reality the same under the ceaseless flux of things.⁶ Rest is but an unperceived motion.⁷

¹ Cf. "The various concepts into which a change can be analysed are therefore so many stable views of the instability of the real." *Op. cit.*, p. 46. Also cf. "And the element is invariably by definition, being a diagram, simplified reconstruction, often a mere symbol, in any case a motionless view of the moving reality." *Op. cit.*, p. 41. If we substitute "concept" for "element" in the passage quoted, we get our Buddhist view.

² P. 128, *Ledi, J. P. T. S.*, 1913-14. Cf. "Accepting the indubitable momentary reality of objects of sense, . . ." *Low. Lec.*, p. 86. Cf. ". . . Reality appears as a ceaseless upspringing of something new, which has no sooner arisen to make the present than it has already fallen back to the past; . . ." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 49.

³ Cf. "Therefore life appears to intellectual apprehension as an extension, as a succession of states. In intuition we see the reality as fluid, as unfixed, before it is congealed into concepts, before even it is perceived as in time and space." *Carr's Phil. of Change*, p. 27.

⁴ Cf. "This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states but only changing states, exist. . . . All reality is therefore tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 55, 59.

⁵ *Compend.* pp. 8, 9, 12. Cf. the Buddhist "stream of Being" with Bergson's "current of life" in the following passage—"At a certain moment, in certain parts of space, a visible current has taken rise; this current of life, traversing the bodies it has organised one after another, passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst species and distributed amongst individuals without losing anything of its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its advance." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 27. Cf. also ". . . life is like a current passing from germ to germ through the medium of a developed organism." *Op. cit.*, p. 28. Cf. further "On flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. . . . Thus souls are continually being created, . . . They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity." *Op. cit.*, p. 284. Does not Bergson here rise to a generality of the great river of life from the little rills which he actually finds?

⁶ Cf. "There is . . . a continual flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 9. Cf. also "Now, there are no two identical moments in the life of the same conscious being." *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁷ Cf. "Rest is never more than apparent or, rather relative." *Op. cit.*, p. 55. Also cf. "It is movement that we must accustom ourselves to look upon as simplest and clearest, immobility being the only extreme limit of the slowing down of movement, a limit reached only, perhaps, in thought and never realised in nature." *Op. cit.*, p. 44. Also cf. "Movement is the reality itself, and what we call rest (*immobilité*) is a certain state of things identical with or analogous to that which is produced when two trains are moving

Ledi sums up:—¹

"The many thousand modes or ways of action which appear in our subjective continua and in the external world² continua . . . are shown to be variously determined. This is true, whether the determinations are new as now manifesting themselves or whether they are old as being vanished experiences. Just as that flowing river or burning flame appears to those who contemplate it as a mode of *motion*, not as static, and the motion itself consists in a continuous process of vanishing past acts and of manifested fresh acts, so all these determinations into various 'acts' are only series of distinct phenomena. . . . made manifest by way of arising and ceasing. And whenever the various modes of cognition . . . are produced as freshly emerging acts, through such and such a causal relation³, they arise, all of them, as something which had not previously arisen."

Reality and Time.

11. Thus the very essence of reality is its mutability.⁴ But its change is ever obscured by our concept of continuity (*Santati-paññatti*) which fosters our hallucination⁵ of perception, ideas and views regarding the real and its impermanence. And it is because of this illusion that our mind 'takes the stable views of the instability' and that our intellect 'starts with the immobility of the moving.'⁶ From the continuity of change, from the perpetual becoming, men have extracted a general notion of eternity of Time,⁷ with the distinctions of past, present and future, but without any objective existence.⁸ Of these three time distinctions the real, from its very nature and from our definition of it, is necessarily confined to the ever present,⁹ because the past thing, though real while it lasted, has gone, gone utterly away, passed away for ever and beyond recall¹⁰ as it was, and the future has not appeared, arisen, become or been born.

with the same velocity in the same direction on parallel rails; each train appears then to be stationary to the travellers seated in the others." Bergson's *la Perception de Change-ment*. See Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 16. I gave this railway illustration to a European gentleman who questioned from England the following passage on p. 11 of the *Compd. of Phil.* "But in the Buddhist view, both the subject and the object are alike transitory, the relation alone between the two impermanent correlates remaining constant."

¹ Pp. 159, 160, Ledi, *J. P. T. S.*, 1913-1914.

² Cf. "Making a clean sweep of everything that is only an imaginative symbol (or a concept, as we Buddhists would say), he will see the material world melt, back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 390.

³ Cf. "Thus a thing may be defined as a certain series of appearances connected with each other by continuity and by causal laws." P. 106, *Low. Lec.* 1914.

⁴ *Pts. of Controy.*, pp. 108-110.

⁵ *Compend.*, p. 216. See also Part II *infra*. Cf. "The fundamental principle of this philosophy is that reality is movement and not something that moves, movement in the meaning of change. The something that moves is an illusion engendered by the intellectual apprehension of the movement." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 176.

⁶ See n. 7, p. 6, *supra*.

⁷ On the Buddhist idea of time, See p. 392, *Pts. of Contr.*

⁸ Cf. "I have on the other hand extracted from it (i. e., perpetual becoming) Becoming in general, i. e., a becoming which is not the becoming of any particular thing and this is what I have called the *time* the state occupies." *Intro. to Mataph.*, p. 39.

⁹ Cf. "Thus an aspect of a 'thing' is a member of the system of aspects which is the 'thing' at that moment." P; 89, *Low. Lec.*, 1914. In *Milinda* p. 77, as in Bergson, things in the making at the present moment, not things made in the past, are spoken of as time that exists.

¹⁰ Cf. "The past is over and done; it is past, not present, it was." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 157.

Cf. also. "In the very fact that it endures, the past which it carries is being added to so that no moment can merely repeat a past moment." *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

Mind.

12. There is no reality that comes and goes so quickly as mind.¹ There is a continuous movement² of mind. But for purposes of explanation Buddhists break up this continuity by dividing the track or *Vithi* left behind into moments and consider mind at each moment. Each momentary conscious state is logically complex but psychologically simple.³ But Buddhists philosophically analyse this inseparable union of a simple indivisible whole into constituent factors and distinguish psychological ultimates or elements as absolutely distinct realities. To an observer from without this continuous flow of mind appears as an orderly succession⁴ of these states due to the uniformity of mental sequence. Ledi compares consciousness to pure water and its components to colouring matters. Each conscious state assumes a different tint according as it is composed of this or that combination of mental properties. Now this water of consciousness is flowing and so we get a moving spectrum of the reality itself instead of a fixed, myriad-tinted spectral back-ground across which Bergson makes the mind move.⁵ Each state shades off into another imperceptibly in this continuously progressive spectrum⁶ of mind, so that it is difficult to discern where one ends and another begins.⁷

There is what Bergson calls creative evolution⁸ in the progress of these states, there being no external agent, human or divine, who says: 'Let *a* come first, *b* next, *c* then'⁹ and so forth. Each preceding state, so to speak

¹ *Pts. of Controv.*, p. 125.

² Cf. "But we are also a continuity of the past moving into the future, this is our mind which endures." Carr's *Phil. of Change.*, p. 86. "... in immediate experience we have a continuity which changes continually and as a whole from moment to moment." *Op. cit.* p. 136. "We can comprehend life before attention to action breaks its continuity, know it not as a succession of states but as the continuous movement or becoming that we name change." *Op. cit.* p. 34.

³ Cf. "But in philosophical analysis the elements we distinguish may have no separate existence, they may be absolutely distinct as realities but exist only in their union." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 184.

⁴ "But each of the separate states is the singling out of illuminating of a point in the fluid mass of our whole physical life. This life is not a congeries of separate states or a succession of events but a continuously moving zone of activity. The whole of our past is present in this zone but not as past, it is manifest in its entirety as an impulse or push, as a tendency, . . ." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 34.

⁵ Cf. "A current of feeling which passed along the spectrum, assuming in turn the tint of each of its shades, would experience a series of gradual changes, each of which would announce the one to follow and would sum up those which preceded it." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 11. Cf. also "Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas such as the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 1.

⁶ *Pts. of Controv.*, p. 393.

⁷ *Op. et loc. cit.* The Buddha explained the succession of states by the relation of "contiguity" (*Anantara*). But he again described the same relation by the intensive "immediate contiguity" (*Samanantara*) in order to emphasise the fact that this succession is a procession in which one state runs into another, so that the procession may not be mistaken for mere *juxta-position*.

⁸ Cf. "... each of our states, at the moment of its issue, modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming. It is then right to say that what we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are to a certain extent what we do, and that we are creating ourselves continually." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 7. Cf. *Dhammapada*, Verse 1.

⁹ P. 30, Vol. II, Saya Pye's combined Ed. of *Tikagyaw and manisaramañjusā*.

announces¹ its immediate successor which in turn inherits the memory² of the past. The past is wrought up into the present as a new, indivisible whole.³ But each advancing state is real only while it lasts.⁴

Matter and Space.

13. Matter, as in Berkeley, is a group of qualities which, though logically distinct, are mutually inseparable⁵ from one another (Avinibhoga) in a simple, indivisible unit.

Now space is to matter what time is to mind. Mansel regards it as a permanent condition of our mind by which we perceive the external object. Buddhists add that it is a permanent concept⁶ which is a sufficing condition for the movement of bodies.⁷ It is empty or void without objective reality and is not perceivable.⁸

¹ *Acikkhati viya*. Cf. "There is a succession of these states each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 9.

² *Compend.*, p. 42. For greater details, see Ledi's *Philosophy of Relations J. P. T. S.* 1915-16. Cf. "Take the simplest sensation, suppose it constant, absorb in it the entire personality, the consciousness which will accompany this sensation cannot remain identical with itself for two consecutive moments, because the second moment always contains over and above the first, the memory that the first has bequeathed to it." *Intro. to Metaph.*, pp. 10, 11.

³ Cf. "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 5. Cf. also "... a duration in which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new." *Op. cit.*, p. 210. Cf. the following passage with the doctrine of Karma—"What are we, in fact what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birthday, even before our birth, since we bring with us pre-natal dispositions?" *Op. Cit.*, p. 5. Cf. "It is the continuation of an indefinite past in a living present." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 154. Again on p. 157, *Op. cit.*, "It (i.e. life) is psychological in its nature, i.e. it is a time existence, something that endures and changes continually, endures by changing in that it carries with it all its past in its present activity," and "But the meaning of duration is that the past though acted and over is continued into and carried along in the present." Cf. the Buddhist idea that "we are all that we have thought" with "What we are is all that we have been." *Op. cit.* p. 178. On indivisibility, cf. "There are no parts which have any separate existence as parts. We know the parts by dissociation within an indivisible whole." *Op. cit.* p. 159.

⁴ Cf. "They can, properly speaking, only be said to form multiple states which I have already passed and turned back to observe their track. Whilst I was experiencing them, they were so solidly organised, so profoundly animated with the common life, that I could not have said, where any one of them have finished or where another commenced. In reality no one of them begins or ends, but all extend into each other.....our past follows us, it swells incessantly with the present that it picks up on its way;..." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 10. Cf. the last sentence in the passage quoted with p. 12. *Compend.*

⁵ *Compend.* p. 160.

⁶ "Kant's doctrine was that space and time are forms of perception. Our doctrine is that they are schematic or diagrammatic in their nature, not qualifying or characterising reality, but an artifice or device by which reality is apprehended." Carr's *Phil. of Change*, p. 133.

⁷ *Pts. of Controy.*, p. 192. Cf. Ledi on space as a sufficing condition (*Upanissaya-paccaya*) of movement in *J. P. T. S.* 1915-16.

⁸ *Pts. of Controy.*, p. 193. Cf. "Again, the positions of the moving body are not parts of the movement, they are points of the space which is supposed to underlie the movement. This empty and immobile space which is merely conceived, never perceived, has the value of a symbol only." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 44. Also cf. "What stationary points are to the movement of a moving body, concepts of different qualities are to the quantitative change of an object." *Op. cit.* p. 46.

Matter is comparatively inert, but it changes in time¹ even when it does not appear to move in space. It gives up its materiality when it gives up its presence and *vice versa* in the same way as mind gives up both mentality and presence at the same time.² This amounts to saying that mind or matter was real only while it lasted. This simple fact, however, is overlooked when we speak of our personality as real by means of stable concepts.

Our Personality.

14. Ledi compares animated or sentient organism to a moving mirror in which objects are reflected according to its position and the incidence of light, from moment to moment throughout its progress in the world.³ Thus our personality is ever changing and ever renewed. E. g., We punish a thief. Assuming that the right person is punished, it is conventionally true to say that the thief is punished, because the prisoner is but a term in the continuous series of—a link in the chain of—personalities A, A₁, A₂, A₃ of that thief. But philosophically speaking, the prisoner cannot be said to be the thief; for, no person is identical at any two consecutive moments in his life history.⁴ There is progression but no repetition in Nature. There is similarity but no logical identity in true philosophy.⁵ My present self is neither quite the same as, nor altogether different from myself a while ago. This is an important point to bear in mind in Buddhist philosophy.

Concluding Remarks.

15. If I have crowded Part I of this essay into a few pages, it is because it will be clear from Part II that the real, from its nature briefly indicated herein, is *lived* rather than *thoguht*.⁶ It is experienced, revealed or realised and is, strictly speaking, inexpressible and incommunicable by language. Hence the less said about the reality, the better. If, on the other hand, I have overloaded these few pages with footnotes, it is because I feel

¹ Cf. "In the smallest discernible fraction of a second, in the almost instantaneous perception of a sensible quality, there may be trillions of oscillations which repeat themselves. The permanence of a sensible quality consists in this repetition of movements,..." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 317. Cf. this passage with *Compnd.*, p. 26. Cf. also "In short, the qualities of matter are so many stable views that we take of its instability. . . . But in reality, the body is changing form at every moment; . . . and form is only a snapshot view of a transition." *Crea. Evol.*, pp. 318, 319.

² *Pts. of Controy.*, pp. 67, 393. Cf. "The first (i. e. intuition) gets at definite object immediately, in the materiality itself." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 157.

³ P. 120, Ledi, *J. P. T. S.*, 1913-14.

⁴ Cf. "From this survival of the past, it follows that consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. The circumstances may still be the same, they will act no longer on the same person, since they find him at a new moment of his history. Our personality which is built up at each instant with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing. By changing it prevents any state, although superficially identical with another, from ever repeating it in its very depth." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 6. According to Buddhism, circumstances, too, cannot remain the same, though they may be similar. Cf., p. 63, Vol. I, *Milinda*.

⁵ Mrs. Rhys. Davids *Buddhism*, p. 131. Cf. ". . . ; in psychical causality the identity is change itself, the reality is duration and not something which endures without changing." *Carr's Phil. of Change*, p. 209.

⁶ Cf. "We do not *think* real time. But we *live* it because life transcends intellect." *Crea. Evol.*, p. 49. Cf. "If we fix the whole attention of mind on this life of ours as we live it, if we realise to ourselves our life as it is being lived, we get an intuition of reality, that is to say not a thought of it, not a perception or conception of it as an object, but a consciousness of the actual life we are living as we live it." *Carr's Phil. of Change*, p. 27.

strongly that Bergson is a modern commentary of Buddhism. My difficulty has been the selection of passages, some of which are repeated in different forms and some of which may be quoted in more than one place. But whether quoted in or out of place, the passages themselves show to my mind that there is a good deal of Buddhism in Bergson without the savant himself being aware of it.

Enough has, however, been said to show that the Buddhist idea of the real is identical with the Bergsonian view of it. But they who fail to *penetrate* this reality 'only see a continuous and static condition'¹ in it.

In Part II I shall show that, of the various kinds of knowledge to be described, penetrative knowledge (*Pativedha-ñāṇa*) is identical with Bergsonian intuition. After indicating the Buddhist method of culture (*Bhāvanā*) how to attain intuition, I shall show why both concept and language, though inadequate in themselves to represent or express the reality intuited, are indispensable; how Buddhist logic, which is identical with Russell's modern logic, is still essential for arriving at abstract, general truths—subjective counterparts of objective realities, which are concrete and particular; and how analysis, especially of general relations embodied in causal laws, as distinguished from particular relations which are real, is useful in philosophy. I shall further show that the future predicated under the uniformity of nature is morally, but not absolutely, certain. Thus when the Buddhist shield of reconciliation between the two opposing modern thinkers is finally presented, then may readers judge for themselves whether the peaceful triumphs of Buddhism still suggest the brandishing of the intellectual swords in the age of Parmenides, as observed by a critic of the *Compendium* in this Journal.²

SIWE ZAN AUNG.

¹ P. 155, Ledi, *J. P. T. S.*, 1913-14. Cf. "... the state taken in itself is a perpetual becoming. I have extracted from this becoming a certain average of quality which I have supposed invariable; I have in this way constituted a stable and consequently schematic state." *Intro. to Metaph.*, p. 39.

² Vol. I, Pt. II.