Agga. Then why conclude that there are no anupadinnaka khandhas in Nibbana when Buddhaghosa tells us that by mind and matter in this connection the Buddha meant the upadinnaka khandhas?Many persons who have never even dreamt of the existence of water elephants deny their existence. A few persons possess dried specimens of this miniature water creature which, in all its appearance is a quadruped with well formed tusks and trunk. The former distrust their senses and cry 'A faked one!' On examining the anatomy of this little animal under a microscope, it is found to he a true structure even as specimens of paleontological flora and fauna preserved in rocks and earth. Would you still doubt the existence of this genus of the little animal?

       Sumana. Certainly not. But it cannot he the same kind of elephant which we know on land.

       Agga. Quite so. In the same way the anupadinnaka khandhas can not possibly be the same as the upadinnaka.

       Sumana. If the anupadinnaka khandhasobtain in Nibbana, why did some authorities speak of the complete cessation of khandhas (Khandha parinibbana) at Kusinara?

       Agga. If Buddhaghosa's interpretation of the Buddha's word be correct only the upadinnaka khandhascease on finally passing away from the world. Just as an event which we call death (sammuti-marana) does not interrupt the natural flow of the reality of life in this world, so the final death (pacchima-cuti) of an Arahant does not interrupt the flow of the reality of Nibbana from the Saupadisea to the Anupadisesa form.

       Sumana. Then you mean that the fruitional consciousness of an Arahant survives after finally passing away from this world?

       Agga. Yes. It is the survival of the fittest flowing on and on with out interruption, any break in its continuity being but an invention of our intellect.

       Sumana. In that case this surviving consciousness would be Nama.

       Agga. Yes. Buddhaghosa says: Namadhammas include four mental khandhas as well as Nibbana. (Namadhammati cattaro arupino khandha ca nibbananca. Commentary on Mula-Ya-maka.)

       Sumana. Is it not that four immaterial khandhas are called Nama because it bends (nameti) the mind to it and that Nibbana is also called Nama because (spiritual) mind tends (namiyati) to it.

       Agga. This grammatical distinction is due to your view of the mind as subject and of Nibbana as object. But the latter cannot be an object without a subject. The fact is that the subject and the object are merged in an intuition. This follows from Buddhaghosa's dictum that Nibbana is the fruitional consciousness itself. Nibbana is not thought but lived. Else Nibbana would he merely lip-bliss.

       Sumana. Am I to understand you to say that individuals exist in Nibbana.?

       Agga. It all depends upon what you mean by 'individual'. If you mean a soul in the sense in which it is generally understood in the West, I would reply No, because the ego idea is but a concept. But if you use the word as a mere label for realities, I would say Yes. Sariputta was a distinct individual from Moggallana on this side of the veil. Why should not their continuations be individually distinct on the other side?

       Each lives his own Nibbana. (Paccattam veditabbo vinnuhi.) But it does not follow that they draw a line of demarcation between meum and tuum on the other side any more than they do on this side.

       Sumana. I cannot agree to individual existence in Nibbana.

       Agga. Sumana, you are a good controversialist. What do you make of the orthodox question whether the Khandhas are one thing, Nibbana another and the soul a third; and the heterodox negative reply in Kathavattu?

       Sumana. I return your compliments. We must go a little way back in order to understand the controverted point.

       Agga. Right.

       Sumana. The believer in the soul committed himself to an opinion that the soul is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The orthodox adherent pointed out that the Buddha taught only two things—conditioned and unconditioned—but not a third.

       Agga. I would say two aspects instead of two things. But be pleased to proceed with your own explanation.

       Sumana. Then the orthodox questioned whether khandhas are conditioned and Nibbana unconditioned. The heterodox reply was in the affirmative. Finally, the question you have referred to was put. And the opponent was cornered and obliged to negative his position that the soul is a third class of things neither conditioned nor unconditioned since it is but a metaphysical abstraction not having a distinct, in dependent existence like realities mentioned. He thereby confirms the distinction between conditioned khandhas and unconditioned Nibbana.

       Agga. A very plausible explanation. But the final question and answer on analysis resolve themselves into:—

       Are Khandhas and Nibbana different?  No.

       Are Khandhas and soul different?  No.

       Are Nibbana and soul different?  No.

       You would like to answer the first of these sub-questions in the affirmative because of your conviction that Khandhas and Nibbana are radically different. But you are called in not to alter the form of the answer but only to interpret it. As the soul is but a metaphysical abstraction as you have pointed out, there are only two terms left to he compared. And their difference is negatived because a conditioned and unconditioned are but two aspects of one and the same reality.

       Sumana. I cannot accept your explanation.

       Agga. What think you of another conversation between the orthodox and his opponent relating to the existence or non-existence of an individual in Nibbana? When asked whether persons (puggalas) who have attained Nibbana exist therein or not, the first heterodox reply was in the affirmative. But when pressed with the further question whether such a person is a permanent soul, the reply was in the negative. Then the opponent shifted his ground and changed his first affirmative answer to negative, But when again pressed with the question whether such a person was annihilated, he was equally compelled to negate annihilation.

       Sumana. The opponent was on the horns of dilemma because of his belief in the soul which is really non-existent.

       Agga. The dilemma is quite independent of the question of soul. If you believe that realities are perduring or abiding without change, you would equally commit yourself to the heresy of eternalism. If, on the other hand, you say that they are annihilated, you would equally adopt the opposite heresy of annihilation. To escape the horns you must say that realities are in a continuous flow.

       Sumana. In the case of realities not surviving the final death, there can be no question of these two heresies because it is only in respect to the soul (atta) that these heresies obtain.

       Agga. But how can a person who believes in the theory of immortal soul possibly commit himself again to the opposite theory of its annihilation? By atta is meant permanent self corresponding to the immortal soul of Europeans. Therefore in our view the attavada is identical with the sassata-ditthi to which is opposed the uccheda-ditthi. Hence the latter view is impossible in respect to atta.

       Again if your views be correct, the opponent having answered that a permanent soul does not exist in Nibbana, there would be no necessity on the part of the orthodox for the further question whether such a nonexistent soul is annihilated.

       Sumana. I forgot. The second question in the Kathavatthu, viz., Is a person who has attained Nibbana annihilated?, was asked by the heterodox believer in the theory of immortal soul.

       Agga. Admitting for argument sake that it was the heterodox question, the orthodox negative reply would rather confirm the view that such a person is not annihilated.

       Sumana.. The orthodox negatived the annihilation of a person because Person does not exist at all, except as a concept, to be annihilated.

       Agga. Plausible. But for reasons already given, that is not the traditional view. According to able translators of Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Kathavatthu, both questions were asked by the orthodox; and they are logical, for when the heterodox replied that the Nibbanic being is not immortal, it was perfectly legitimate for the orthodox to press his opponent with the further question as to annihilation, as explained by me above.

       Sumana. Let that be. But the answers of the opponent are not of much value.

       Agga. Then let us reverse the position by attending to the Buddha's own answers to King Kosala's questions in the Samyutta respecting the existence of individual beings in Nibbana.

       The first pair of his answers was: 'Neither do I declare that such a being is existent nor do I declare that he is non-existent.' The Buddha indulged in this apparent paradox in order to avoid the two extreme views of eternalism and annihilation. But if there were no such a being at all in Nibbana, what necessity was there for the Buddha to re-affirm his existence?

       Sumana. But did not the Buddha tell the King that such a Nibbanic being is altogether freed from mind and body?

       Agga. Assuredly not. He said that such a being is free or freed from concepts of mind and matter (rupasankha-vimutto. . . . vinnanasankhavimutto) instead of saying free from mind and matter (rupa-vimutto ... vinnana-vimutto). He further told the King that such a Nibbanic being is deep like an ocean and is difficult to understand. But this remark is intended for all who cannot avoid concepts. The author of the Netti used the word sankhaye (in extinction) instead of sankha (from concepts). This makes all the difference in the world. He regards the Nibbanic being as free in the extinction of colour, sound, odour, taste, touch and knowablity Cupasankhaye vimutto...... dhammasankhaye vimutto). In this view the Nibbanic being is a colourless, soundless, odourless, tasteless, intangible and unknowable being. How can Nibbana which is included in the cognizable objects (dhammayatana) be realised in the extinction of dhammarammanas? Free from what? If you take Nibbana as an object of transcendental consciousness, it would be a manifest contradiction to say that it is extinct as such. But if you take it to be a subject identical with the fruitional consciousness of an Arahant, how can it subsist without an object? I have more than once repeated that the subject and the object are merged in one reality, Nibbana, which is simply lived without a thought of any of its aspects which would strike an outside observer.

       Sumana. I understand you to hold that the mental khandhas obtain in Nibbana. But did not some writers say that it is emancipated from khandhas (khandha-nissato)?

       Agga. The Compendium has khandha-sangaha-nissata, literally 'Freed from the reckoning of khandhas'. You should understand it in the sense of freedom from the upadinnaka,-khandhas or in that of freedom from concepts of khandhas.

       Sumana. But did not the Buddha say in the Udana that there is no earth, no water, no fire, no air, no sun, no moon, etc., in Nibbana?

       Agga. Yes, because there are no concepts of all these objects to a Nibbanic being.

       Sumana. Will you now summarise your position?

       Agga. The Nibbana of a being is his own mind purged from corruptions. It forms no exception to the law of reality. That is, it is a continuous flowing existence. Though the Nibbana of yesterday is not that of today, Nibbana is spoken of as permanent (i. e. sassate or dhuva) in the sense that once attained it never reverts to a worldly state. These two words are not to be understood in the sense in which they are used by the heterodox believers to designate a permanent abiding soul. They must be understood rather in the sense in which modern statesmen use the word 'permanent' when they speak of permanent peace as one that will never be again disturbed by a state of war.

       Sumana. Granted that there is such a purified spiritual mind in Nibbana. Would you allow the existence of body also therein.?

       Agga. We know that transcendental consciousness is always associated with body. But we are taught to believe also that mind can exist independently of body in the Arupa world and that the arahant exists also in that world. It is difficult to decide whether the Arahants develop their spiritual bodies as well as on the other side of the veil. The author of the Anutika says that Nibbana is something like subtle matter? (Nibbanam pana sukhuma-rupa-gatikam.) Whether he refers to the spiritual substance of mind or body is not clear. At this stage of our discussion I would hand over the argument to my friend from Henzada as his master held that there is unique body as well in Nibbana.

       Teja. Yes, my master cited the Sutta of the Tiloka-Cakravatti in support of his contention. The Buddha told us that when he was that universal monarch he built mansions and invited the previous Buddhas and Arahants from Nibbana and that their doubles (nimmita-rupas) came.

       Sunmana. How do you know that these were not the mental creations of the King himself?

       Teja. Because they are said to have conversed on philosophy (abhidhamma) which the King at that time did not understand. If they were his own creations, they would not be able to go beyond his mind. That is, be could not possibly suggest philosophical ideas which were not in his mind. Hence we must assume that the real Buddhas and Arahants who were ever living their own flowing Nibbanas, created their own doubles just as the Buddha himself in his lifetime in this world is said to have created a double for preaching philosophy to the gods in the Tavatimsa heaven during his temporary absence on earth.

       Sumana. Supposing they were living as pure spiritual minds, could they not materialise bodies for such occasions?

       Teja. Possible.

       Sumana. There is some difficulty in the supposition that Nibbanic beings ever associate themselves with the concerns of this world. U Agga has told us that a Nibbanic being consists of the fruitional consciousness of the highest Ariyanship solely occupied with its own tranquillity, calm or peace as its object. How would it be possible for such a self-absorbed being to hear the appeals of Tiloka from this earth?. Or if he be supposed to be endowed with supernormal powers to know the wishes of worldly people, as by telepathy, his Nibbanic flow would be interrupted.

       Teja. The time of such interruption would he so short as to be negligible. In any case such interruption, if any would be no more than that of the Saupadisesa by Kiriya-cittas, (non-effective thoughts).

       Agga. Even assuming that a Nibbanic being cannot or will not think of this world, it does not invalidate my argument for spiritual existence in Nibbana.

       Tissa. I have taken very little active part in this lively discussion. But methinks the moon-lit hills of Sagaing are illumined with greater radiance and lustre to-night even as the beauty and brilliancy of the moon-lit groves of Gosing was enhanced by the righteous discourse on philosophy between the Great Moggallana and another.

       Teja. I have also been, more or less, a listener. These hills, secluded from the noisy bustle of the world, seem to me to resound with a sweet resonance which will produce reverberating echoes throughout the length and breadth of the country, aye, the whole of the Buddhist world.

       Agga. It augurs well that both of you appreciate our friendly exchange of views and I have no misgivings that something good will come of our meeting on this auspicious occasion. Sumana, I am very pleased to have an opportunity of discussing with you the question of questions. A problem, rationally approached, is on its fair way to proper solution. I trust that you will hear the message of Nibbana to the world. Brethren, the night has far advanced and it is time for us to retire. Good night to all.


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